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OUT WITH THE NEW, IN WITH THE OLD: RE-
IMPLEMENTING TRADITIONAL FORMS OF JUSTICE 
IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
By Nicholas R. Sanchez 
 
I speak for our ancestors. 
They cry out to you from the unstill grave. 
I speak for the children yet unborn. 
They cry out to you from the unspoken silence. 
 
I am the Indian voice. 
Listen to me! 
I am a chorus of millions. 
Hear us! 
Our Eagle cry will not be stilled! 
* * * 
We are the voice of the earth, 
Of the future, 
Of the Mystery. 
 
-Leonard Peltier282 
 
Think of a system with an end goal of restorative justice, 
which uses equality and the full participation of disputants 
in a final decisiRQ. If Ze Va\ Rf OaZ WhaW: ³Oife cRPeV fURP iW,´ 
then where there is hurt, there must be healing. 
 
-Chief Justice of the Navajo Nation Robert Yazzie283 
 
 
 
282 LEONARD PELTIER, PRISON WRITINGS, 48±49 (Harvey Arden, 1999). 
283 Robert Yazzie, Life Comes from It: Navajo Justice, DAILY GOOD NEWS THAT 
INSPIRES (Jun. 30, 2016), http://www.dailygood.org/story/1327/life-comes-from-
it-navajo-justice-chief-justice-robert-yazzie// [https://perma.cc/W6WG-XLKS]. 
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Euro-American law has viewed the tribal justice system with 
disdain and mistrust. 284 Often times, outright racist and slanderous 
language has been used to describe traditional tribal justice systems. 
FoU inVWance, WUadiWional foUmV of jXVWice haYe been called ³Ued 
man¶V UeYenge.´285  
However, traditional forms of Indian286 justice tend to be 
more similar to civil alternative dispute resolutions or mediation 
Whan Wo Whe U.S.¶V pXniWiYe cUiminal jXVWice V\VWem.287 These justice 
systems are important to Indian victims to allow healing to the 
individual, the community, and even the offender.  
Because of the differences and mistrust between tribal 
justice and Euro-American justice systems, the U.S. Legislature and 
Whe fedeUal coXUWV haYe conWinXall\ limiWed WUibal coXUWV¶ 
jurisdiction.288 Legislation and Supreme Court cases have placed 
limits on jurisdiction that have hindered the ability for Indians to use 
traditional forms of justice to help heal victims, offenders, and 
Indian communities.289  Perhaps the biggest obstacle to traditional 
justice is the fact that, because of legislative actions and case law, 
tribal courts have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.290 
Until 1978, Indian people in the U.S. held the ability to 
prosecute non-Indians for crimes committed on tribal lands. In 1978, 
the Supreme Court limited tribal courts¶ cUiminal jXUiVdicWion Wo onl\ 
Indian people in a decision called Oliphant. After Oliphant, if a non-
Indian commits a crime in Indian Country, the non-Indian cannot be 
prosecuted in tribal courts.291 Non-Indian defendants may only be 
prosecuted in federal district court or state court²federal courts 
 
284 Barbara Creel, Tribal Court Convictions and the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines: Respect for Tribal Courts and Tribal People in Federal Sentencing, 
46 U.S.F. L. REV. 37, 58 (2011). 
285 Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ca, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883).  
286 The term Indian is used in this paper as that is the term is used in the United 
States Constitution and statutory law. To keep consistent throughout this paper, 
Indian will be used to mean Indigenous or Native American. 
287 Robert D. Garrett, Mediation in Native America, 49 DISP. RESOL. J. 38, 39 
(1994). 
288 See, e.g., Major Crimes Act 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2013) (diminishing criminal 
jurisdiction for serious crimes to federal courts); Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 
25 U.S.C. § 1301±1341 (2010) (forcing a modified version of the Bill of Rights 
onto Tribal governments); Oliphant v. Suquamish, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) 
(disallowing tribes to prosecute non-Indians, for crimes committed in Indian 
Country) (hereinafter Oliphant). 
289 See supra Section I. 
290 See supra Section I, II. 
291 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 204. 
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have jurisdiction over non-Indians and for some tribes, whose land 
is governed by Public Law 280, states have jurisdiction. 292 
However, given the limited resources that federal prosecutors 
have,293 the high crimes rates on reservations,294 and the relatively 
low federal prosecution rates for several common crimes committed 
in Indian Country295 crimes committed by non-Indians on tribal 
lands are rarely investigated or prosecuted.296  
In this paper, I argue that Oliphant has limited the ability for 
Indian people to heal and recover from crimes that harm individuals 
and the community. Section I gives a background of the history of 
Indian criminal law and explains the current test for criminal 
jurisdiction for tribal courts. Section II explores the Montana rule, 
which governs whether there is civil jurisdiction over non-Indians 
in tribal courts. Section III introduces Navajo Peacemaking, a 
traditional form of justice, as a case study for other forms of 
traditional justice. The purpose, procedure, and history of 
peacemaking is described as well. Next, the section presents one city 
that has used peacemaking as a basis for their own justice system. 
This Section further discusses how traditional forms of justice can 
help Indian and non-Indian people. Section IV proposes using civil 
jurisdiction to employ traditional justice techniques to what would 
otherwise be criminal matters. Specifically, it explores creating civil 
jurisdiction for non-Indians by creating a consensual relationship 
using contracts.  
One possible way to re-implement traditional forms of 
jXVWice deVpiWe WhiV obVWacle, iV b\ XVing a ³conVenVXal UelaWionVhip´ 
to create civil jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court has 
recognized that an Indian nation has civil authority when the parties 
enWeU ³conVenVXal UelaWionVhipV´ ZiWh Whe WUibe oU iWV membeUV.297 
 
292 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2010) (giving state jurisdiction over criminal matters in 
Indian Country); Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 204. 
293 Larry Cunningham, Deputization of Indian Prosecutors: Protecting Indian 
Interests in Federal Court, 88 GEO. L.J. 2187, 2203 (2000). 
294 Id. at 2198 (stating that ³IndianV face a diVpUopoUWionaWel\ higheU UaWe of 
YiolenW cUimeV Whan oWheU UaceV.´). 
295 Id. at 2203 (federal prosecutors are busy prosecuting the many other 
nationally recognized cases within their very broad subject-matter 
jXUiVdicWion«In conWUaVW, Indian country offenses are often relatively 
minoU«like dUXnk dUiYing, UeckleVV dUiYing, peWW\ WhefW, peWW\ aVVaXlW, YandaliVm, 
liWWeUing, and eYen paUking YiolaWionV.´).  
296 Id. 
297 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 547, 565 (1981). 
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Although it has not been fully litigated, the Supreme Court has 
explained that such relationships can be created by commercial 
dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.298 To form the 
consensual relationship could be as simple as putting up a sign 
requiring those who enter Indian Country to consent to tribal court 
jurisdiction.299 To constitute a consensual relationship a contract 
between the tribe and non-Indian visitors, would have to be valid 
under contract law and have a sufficient nexus to implementing 
traditional justice. 
The paper concludes that non-Indians should be subject to 
traditional forms of justice to keep tribal people healthy, keep their 
community safe, and further the goals of tribal courts. This paper 
proposes that these goals can be met within the confines of current 
Supreme Court case law. Specifically, tribes could use their civil 
regulatory power to expand traditional forms of justice akin to civil 
alternative dispute resolution.  
 
I. THE HISTORY AND CURRENT LIMITATIONS OF CRIMINAL 
TRIBAL JURISDICTION 
 
In the context of criminal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court 
and Legislative Branch have set out the parameters of their 
jurisdiction thoroughly. The implementation of Euro-American 
laws into Indian justice systems have substantially limited tribal 
sovereignty.300 This Section discusses major Supreme Court 
decisions, legislation, and the current test for criminal and civil 
jurisdiction over non-Indians. 
Following the first contact between Indian people and 
Europeans, Europeans started to settle America with the purpose to 
trade with the Indigenous populations and to acquire lands.301 In 
1787, a newly formed United States of America adopted its 
constitution and formalized the relationship the country had with 
 
298 Id. at 565. 
299 A sign is only one potential way to make a contract. Tribes can find creative 
ways to create a contractual relationship with those on or using their land. 
300 Zoann Snyder-Joy, Self-Determination and American Indian Justice, NATIVE 
AMERICANS, CRIME, AND JUSTICE 38 (Marianne O. Nielsen & Robert Sullivan 
1996). 
301 FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BROKEN LANDSCAPE INDIANS, INDIAN TRIBES, AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 3 (2009). 
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Indians.302 Diplomatic interactions between the two parties, after the 
Revolutionary War, usually culminated in treaties, which were 
agreements between two sovereigns.303 Although there were over 
350 treaties signed, nearly all have since been broken or 
disregarded.304 Even though the U.S. Constitution recognizes tribal 
sovereignty in the Indian Commerce Clause, there has been no 
constitutional test or boundary set to prevent over-encroachment 
into that sovereignty.305  
 
A. The History of Criminal Law in Indian Country 
 
Indian criminal law and jurisdiction is a jumbled puzzle of 
Supreme Court cases and legislative actions that have resulted in a 
steady decline of tribal sovereignty. The following is the history of 
relevant cases and legislative action that create the modern test for 
criminal jurisdiction. 
 
1. Standing in Federal Courts and the Cherokee Nation 
Cases 
 
The Cherokee Nation cases are the cornerstone of which 
Indian jurisdictional issues were built upon. The Cherokee Nation 
cases were two of the three cases that make up what has become 
known as the Marshall Trilogy, named for Supreme Court Justice 
John Marshall, who penned them.306 The two Marshall trilogy cases 
that relate to tribal criminal jurisdiction are Cherokee Nation v. State 
of Georgia307 and Worcester v. Georgia.308  
 
 
 
 
 
302 Id. 
303 Id. 
304 Id. 
305 Id. 
306 These three cases are the cornerstone of the legal and political standing of 
Indian naWionV. JohnVon Y. M¶InWoVh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823); CheUokee NaWion Y. 
State of Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831) (hereinafter Cherokee Nation); Worcester v. 
Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832) (hereinafter Worcester). 
307 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. 1. 
308 Worcester, 31 U.S. 515.  
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a. Cherokee Nation v. the State of Georgia, the 
Creation of the Domestic Dependent Nation 
 
Cherokee Nation, was the paramount case on Indian criminal 
jurisdiction. The Cherokee Nation was facing the Removal Act of 
1830, pursuant to which the Cherokee were forcefully removed from 
their homes resulting in the death of twenty percent of the Cherokee 
population.309 The Cherokee Nation challenged the removal in two 
ways. First, they wrote a plea to the United States government.310 
Congress was unmoved, and President Jackson refused to uphold 
the Cherokee Nations treaty rights. 311 The Cherokee Nation then 
appealed to the Supreme Court.  
In Whe CheUokee NaWion¶V appeal Wo Whe SXpUeme CoXUW Whe 
TUibe inYoked Whe CoXUW¶V oUiginal jXUiVdicWion, bXW GeoUgia 
qXeVWioned Whe CoXUW¶V original jurisdiction.312 The Supreme Court 
only has original jurisdiction, as established in Article II of the 
ConVWiWXWion, ZheUe WheUe iV a caVe ³affecWing AmbaVVadoUV, oWheU 
public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be 
party. The Cherokee Nation argued that the Supreme Court had 
original jurisdiction Wo heaU iWV caVe VWaWing WhaW iW ZaV a ³foUeign 
naWion´ againVW a VWaWe.313 The Supreme Court decided that an Indian 
WUibe iV noW a ³foUeign VWaWe´ in AUWicle III WeUmV, becaXVe in AUWicle I, 
Section 8, treats Indian tribes and foreign nations as discrete, and 
not identical entities.314 
Justice Marshall, continuing his opinion in dicta, created an 
Indian law doctrine which has been both a blessing and a curse to 
Indian Sovereignty. The Court pronounced the relationship in which 
the Federal Government and Indian tribes interact for purposes of 
 
309 Indian Removal: 1814-1858, PBS, 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part4/4p2959.html [https://perma.cc/2LW4-
95UN] (last visited Dec. 19, 2017). 
310 Pommersheim, supra note 20, at 103 (The Cherokee Nation wrote a 
memoUial Wo CongUeVV VWaWing: ³[Z]e ZiVh Wo Uemain on Whe landV of oXU faWheUV. 
We have a perfect and original right to remain without interruption or 
molestation. The treaties guarantee our resident and privileges and secures us 
against intruders. Our only request is, that these treaties may be fulfilled, and 
WheVe laZV e[ecXWed.´). 
311 Id. 
312 Id. at 104. 
313 Id.; Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 11. 
314 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 11. 
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Indian affaiUV aV one of ³pXpilage.´315 TUibeV aUe ³domeVWic 
dependenW naWionV´ of Whe fedeUal goYeUnmenW and Whe ³gXaUdian-
ZaUd´ analog\ haV become a docWUine of Whe WUXVW UelaWionVhip 
between the United States and tribal nations.316 
The decision both recognized the tribal sovereignty, and 
reasoned WhaW WUibeV aUe UelianW on Whe fedeUal goYeUnmenW¶V 
³kindneVV and iWV poZeU.´317 This case defined U.S.-tribal relations 
as a fiduciary relationship where the trustee, the United States, acts 
for the beneficiary tribe in regard to land, natural resources, and 
protecting the tribe from states imposing their power over the 
tribe.318 
The opinion in Cherokee Nation recognized an essential 
tribal sovereignty, created a unique tribal-federal relationship, and 
established a basic principle in Indian law that the federal 
government, not the states, has exclusive authority in Indians affairs. 
 
b. Worcester v. Georgia, the Creation of Tribal 
Sovereignty 
 
Two years later, tribal jurisdiction was questioned again in 
Worcester. However, this case was appealed using the Supreme 
CoXUW¶V appellaWe jXUiVdicWion, and in WhiV caVe Whe CoXUW VWaWed iWV 
appellaWe jXUiVdicWion oYeU Whe maWWeU ZaV ³cleaU.´319 The substantive 
issue was: did Georgia have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians 
on Indian land? This time, the Court, able to reach the substantive 
matter, answered in the negative. 
The CoXUW, Uecogni]ing Whe WUibe¶V VoYeUeignW\ and Whe WUXVW 
relationship between the Government and the tribe looked to the 
WUeaW\. The CoXUW noWed WhaW Whe WUeaW\: ³e[pliciWl\ Uecogni]e[eV] Whe 
national character of the Cherokees, and their right of self-
government; thus, guaranteeing their lands; assuming the duty of 
protection, and of course pleading the faith of the United States for 
that protection; has been frequently renewed, and is now in full 
foUce.´ 320 The Court stated that because the government, by making 
a WUeaW\ ZiWh Whe Indian WUibe, Uecogni]eV Whem aV a ³diVWincW, 
 
315 Id. at 13. 
316 Pommersheim, supra note 20, at 105. 
317 Id. 
318 Id. 
319 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
320 Id. at 519. 
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independent political communit[y], retaining their original natural 
UighWV.´321 Therefore, the State cannot impose its legal system on 
tribal lands to either Indians or non-Indians.322  
 
2. Kan-gi-shun-ca, the Creation of Criminal Jurisdiction  
 
Kan-gi-shun-ca, or the case formerly known as Crow 
Dog,323 furthered the recognition of tribal sovereignty, by 
recognizing criminal jurisdiction over Indians on a reservation as 
inheUenW Wo a WUibe¶V VoYeUeignW\.324 In this case, Kan-gi-shun-ca shot 
and killed Chief Spotted Tail.325 Both the victim and assailant were 
Brule Sioux and Brule law required that Kan-gi-shun-ca make 
UepaUaWionV Wo SpoWWed Tail¶V famil\, WhXV pUoYiding jXVWice foU Whe 
YicWim¶V famil\.326 While justice had been served under traditional 
Brule law, non-Indians who lived near the reservation were not 
satisfied with the outcome, and Kan-gi-shun-ca was arrested.327 
Kan-gi-shun-ca was found guilty of murder and sentenced to 
hang.328 Kan-gi-shun-ca appealed his sentence, as the Supreme 
Court ruled that the government did not have jurisdiction over 
Indian on Indian crime.329 
Similar to Worcester, the U.S. Supreme Court looked to the 
treaty to find jurisdiction as the tribe was recognized as a sovereign 
VWaWe WhUoXgh Whe WUibe¶V WUeaW\. The Court stated that the Brule 
SioX[¶V WUeaW\ onl\ diVcXVVed Whe foUfeiWXUe of cUiminal jXUiVdicWion 
of non-Indians committing crimes within Indian Country and 
³offenVeV commiWWed b\ IndianV againVW ZhiWe peUVonV.´330 Because 
 
321 Id. 
322 Snyder-Joy, supra note 19 at 39. 
323 Ex Parte Kan-gi-shun-ca, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883) (Kan-gi-shun-ca is Crow 
Dog in the traditional Sioux Brule language). 
324 CARRIE E. GARROW & SARAH DEER, TRIBAL CRIMINAL LAW AND 
PROCEDURE, 40 (Jerry Gardner, 2004). 
325 Id.  
326 Id. 
327 Id. 
328 Id. 
329 Id. 
330 Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ca, 109 U.S. 556, 563, 571 (1883) (Ueading WhaW, ³[i]f 
bad men among the whites or among other people subject to the authority of the 
United States shall commit any wrong upon the person or property of the 
Indians, the United States will, upon proof made to the agent and forwarded to 
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs at Washington City, proceed at once to 
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of the language of the treaty, it was clear that the Brule Sioux 
forfeited criminal jurisdiction to the state with crimes involving an 
Indian and non-Indian.331 Although the tribe forfeited its ability to 
prosecute non-Indians in the treaty, the treaty did not discuss Indian-
on-Indian crime.332 Therefore, the United States did not have 
jurisdiction over Indian-on-Indian crime.  The court in its reasoning 
noWed WhaW WUibeV aUe WheiU ³oZn poliWical bod\´ and WhaW a paUW of 
being iWV oZn poliWical bod\ ³neceVVaUil\ implieV´ Whe abiliW\ of 
³Velf-goveUnmenW.´333 InclXding Whe abiliW\ Wo ³UegXlaW[e] b\ 
themselves . . . their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of 
order[,] and peace among their own members by the administration 
of WheiU oZn laZV and cXVWomV.´334 
 
3. CongUeVV¶V ReVponVe Wo Kan-gi-shun-ca: the Major 
Crimes Act 
 
CongUeVV, Xnhapp\ ZiWh Whe SXpUeme CoXUW¶V deciVion, came 
out with the Major Crimes Act of 1885, 18 U.S.C. § 1153.335 The 
Major Crimes Act gives criminal jurisdiction to federal courts for 
seven crimes²murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to 
kill, arson, burglary, and larceny.336 The Major Crimes Act had been 
originally proposed by the Indian Rights Association (IRA).337 The 
IRA believed that what was best for Indians was to assimilate to 
Euro-American culture and to follow the rules of whites.338  
The Major Crimes Act was deliberately lobbied for the 
purpose of assimilation, even though many missionaries and 
teachers on reservations had noticed that as the reach of traditional 
Indian law was diminished, the crimes from and against Indians 
began to increase at a disturbing rate.339 For instance, Bishop H. 
 
cause the offender to be arrested and punished according to the laws of the 
United States and also reimburse the injured person foU Whe loVV VXVWained.´). 
331 Id. 
332 Id. at 572. 
333 Id. at 568. 
334 Id. 
335 Garrow, supra note 43, at 40; 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2013). 
336 18 U.S.C. § 1154 (2013). 
337 Garrow, supra note 43, at 44. 
338 Id. 
339 Id. 
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Hare, a missionary for the Sioux tribe, noted that as the Sioux 
Indian¶V legal V\VWem began Wo diVappeaU: 
 
Civilization has loosened . . . Women are brutally 
beaten and outraged; men are murdered in cold 
blood; the Indians who are friendly to schools and 
churches are intimidated and preyed upon by the 
evil-disposed; children are molested on their way to 
school, and schools are dispersed by bands of 
vagabonds; but there is no redress . . . as long as by 
the absence of law Indian society is left without a 
base.340 
 
Pursuant to the Major Crimes Act, Indian people were now subject 
to Euro-American law and punishment. Because the previous 
restorative justice foundations that Indian culture was built upon had 
been swiftly eroded in a single act, a void was created on 
reservations for law and order. 
 
4. Indian Civil Rights Act 
 
The Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), was enacted in 1968, 
for the purpose of guaranteeing Indian tribes some of the protections 
that are guaranteed to states.341 While ICRA did promulgate some 
of the Bill of Rights to tribes, it also severely restricted the ability 
for tribes to use their court systems to have a justice system, as tribes 
were only able to subject a person to a sentence no greater than one 
year of imprisonment or a fine of $5,000.342 
ICRA was proposed in response to Indians complaining of 
civil rights depravations on reservation land.343  In response, the bill 
was framed by Senator Sam Erwin (D-NC) as a remedy for what he 
saw was an inability of the tribes to administer justice on 
reservations.344 That is even though Indian nations complained 
 
340 Id. at 45. 
341 11 Fed. Proc. Forms § 41:71; 41 Am. Jur. 2d Indians; Native Americans § 29. 
342 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(B) (2010). 
343 Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the American Indian Before the 
Subcomm. On Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 87th 
Cong., pt. 3, at 769 (1962). 
344 Donald L. BXUneWW, JU., An HiVWoUical Anal\ViV of Whe 1968 µIndian CiYil 
RighWV¶ AcW, 9 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 557, 582±588 (1972) (listing the 
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during the drafting period; expressing concerns over the trouncing 
of culture and traditions the bill would cause.345 By applying most 
of the Bill of Rights provisions to Indian nations, Congress directly 
shaped the development and application of tribal law.346 
ICRA also granted power to Indian nations by defining their 
³poZeUV of Velf-goYeUnmenW.´347 These powers include: ³all 
governmental powers possessed by an Indian tribe, executive, 
legislative, and judicial, and all offices, bodies, and tribunals by and 
WhUoXgh Zhich Whe\ aUe e[ecXWed.´348 This text expressly grants 
Indian nations judicial power, one that the United States Supreme 
Court previously had assumed was inherent in their right to self-
govern.349 
ICRA was later amended to include Public Law 280.350 This 
amendment gave some specifically listed states criminal jurisdiction 
in Indian Country.351 Originally, Public LaZ 280¶V jXUiVdicWion ZaV 
mandatory for both the state and the tribe, but it was later amended 
so that the state can retrocede their criminal jurisdiction.352  
 
5. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, Taking Away 
Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction over non-Indians  
 
 
mistreatments as physical abuses towards Indians, the failure to prosecute 
crimes, refusal to fund tribal justice systems, and imposition of federal 
restrictions on the operation of tribal courts); see also Hearings on 
Constitutional Rights of the American Indian Before the Subcomm. On 
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 87th Cong., pt. 3, at 
769 (1962) (statement of Sen. Ervin). 
345 Samuel E. Ennis & Caroline P. Mayhew, Federal Indian Law and Tribal 
Criminal Justice in the Self-Determination Era, 38 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 421, 434 
(2014). 
346 Id.  
347 Pub. L. No. 90±284, tit. II, § 201(2), 82 Stat. 73, 77 (1968) (codified as 
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2012)).   
348 Habeas corpus, 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2012). 
349 Ex Parte Kan-gi-shun-ca, 109 U.S. 556, 565. (1883). 
350State Jurisdiction Over Offenses Committed by or Against Indians in the 
Indian Country, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2012); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321±1326 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 
(2012)). 
351 Assumption by State of Criminal Jurisdiction, 25 U.S.C. § 1321 (2011); 
Those five states were California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. 
Later, Alaska was added. Public Law 280, TRIBAL COURT CLEARINGHOUSE, 
http://www.tribal-institute.org/lists/pl280.htm [https://perma.cc/ENG2-MHCP]. 
352 Retrocession of Jurisdiction by State, 25 U.S.C. § 1323. (2011). 
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In Oliphant, the Supreme Court ruled that tribal courts do 
not have jurisdiction over offenders that are non-Indian.353 In 
Oliphant, two non-Indians, Mark Oliphant and Daniel Belgrade, 
lived on a reservation and independently violated Suquamish Law 
and Order Code.354 Mark Oliphant was arrested for assaulting a 
tribal police officer and resisting arrest. Daniel Belgrade was 
arrested for taking tribal police on a high-speed chase through 
reservation land and crashing into a tribal police car. They were 
arraigned and an appeal followed, in which the federal district court 
ruled that tribal courts had no jurisdiction over non-Indians.355 
The Suquamish Indian Tribe argued that criminal 
jXUiVdicWion oYeU all peUVonV on a UeVeUYaWion iV a ³sine qua non´356 
of tribal sovereignty.357 The Supreme Court disagreed stating that 
CongUeVV had ³belieYed´ Whe\ legiVlaWed Whe inabiliW\ foU IndianV Wo 
impose criminal penalties to non-Indians and that the Supreme 
Court at that point expressly forbade it.358 
This decision was a major blow to tribal sovereignty and 
reaffirmed the belief of many Indians that they were powerless to 
stop people of other races from committing crimes against them.359 
For the tribal police, the decision was an attack on their ability to 
protect their own people.360 Scholars cUiWici]ed JXVWice RehnqXiVW¶V 
opinion aV a ³noYel depaUWXUe fUom Whe baVic WeneW of Indian laZ . . . 
that Indian tribes retain inherent sovereignty over internal affairs 
abVenW e[pUeVV abUogaWion b\ CongUeVV.´361 In this respect, Justice 
Rehnquist reversed the deference given to Congress over Indians, 
holding that Indians can only have criminal authority over non-
IndianV ZiWh CongUeVV¶V appUoYal ZheUe geneUall\, befoUe WhiV 
 
353 Oliphant v Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,195. (1978). 
354 Id. at 194. 
355 Id. at 191. 
356 Meaning an essential condition. 
357 Id. at 196. 
358 Id. at 204±10. 
359 Geoffrey C. Helsey, Oliphant and Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction over Non-
IQdiaQV: AVVeUWiQg CRQgUeVV¶V POeQaU\ PRZeU WR ReVWRUe TeUUiWRUiaO 
Jurisdiction, 73 IND L.J. 1051, 1055 (1998). 
360 Id. 
361 Philip S. Deloria & Neil Jessup Newton, The Criminal Jurisdiction of Tribal 
Courts Over Non-Member Indians, 38 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 70, 71 (1991) 
(³Throughout most of the history of federal Indian law, the United States 
Supreme Court has expresses extraordinary deference to Congress as the 
pUincipal polic\makeU in Indian affaiUV.´); CongUeVV¶V poZeU in WhiV aUea iV 
UefeUUed Wo aV iWV ³plenaU\ poZeU.´ Id. 
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decision, Indians had authority unless Congress had taken that 
authority away. 
While the Oliphant decision severely limited criminal 
jurisdiction, later decisions have allowed tribes to use civil 
regulatory powers that this paper argues could be used to implement 
traditional means of Indian justice.362 
 
B. Current Test for Criminal Law Jurisdiction 
 
The current test for criminal jurisdiction is oftentimes 
deVcUibed aV a ³paWchZoUk´ jXUiVdicWion.363 Three distinct 
governments are involved in criminal jurisdiction for Indians: tribal, 
state, and federal.364 There is a four-part inquiry to determine if one 
of those three government entities have criminal jurisdiction²(1) 
where did the crime occur?; (2) does a federal statute, such as Public 
Law 280, confer exclusive jurisdiction on a state?; (3) is the crime 
one of general federal applicability?; (4) what is the race of the 
victim and the accused?365 
 
1. Was the Crime Physically Committed in Indian 
Country 
 
The first question in the inquiry is whether the crime 
occXUUed ZiWhin Whe boXndV of ³Indian CoXnWU\.´ Indian CoXnWU\ iV 
statutorily defined as ³all land ZiWhin Whe limiWV of an\ Indian 
UeVeUYaWion´; ³all dependenW Indian commXniWieV´; and ³all Indian 
alloWmenWV, Whe Indian WiWleV Wo Zhich haYe noW been e[WingXiVhed.´366 
Indian Country does cover land that is owned by non-
Indians. For instance, during the Allotment Era, large amounts of 
Indian land were sold off to white people heading west.367 This 
created a checkerboard effect on Indian land.368 After the Allotment 
Era ended, the checkerboard was defined as a part of Indian Country, 
 
362 See infra Section I. C. 
363 Cunningham, supra note 129, at 2189. 
364 Id. 
365 Id. 
366 Indian country defined, 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a)±(c) (1994). 
367 Robert T. Anderson, Negotiating Jurisdiction: Retroceding State Authority 
Over Indian Country Granted by Public Law 280, 87 WASH. L. REV. 915, 920±
21 (2012). 
368 Id. 
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as part of the treaty land promised to Indians, but was no longer 
owned by Indians.369 A ³dependenW Indian commXniW[\]´ iV land WhaW 
iV ³dependenW on Whe fedeUal goYeUnmenW foU aVViVWance.´370 All that 
iV UeqXiUed iV WhaW Whe commXniW\ be ³a ZaUd of Whe fedeUal 
goYeUnmenW.´ 371  
If the crime was not committed in Indian Country, the state 
or federal government has authority over the matter.372 If the crime 
was committed on Indian Country, then the second question is 
asked. 
 
2. Federal Statute Conferring Exclusive Jurisdiction on a 
State 
 
The second question is whether a federal statute confers 
exclusive jurisdiction to a state. Congress has the inherent power to 
change jurisdiction between the tribal, state, and federal 
judiciaries.373 The largest conference of judicial authority was done 
through the passage of Public Law 280, wherein 1953, the federal 
government mandated criminal jurisdiction to five states.374 In 1968 
that statute was amended to add a sixth state and allowed the tribe 
to consent to the jurisdiction.375 Congress has also ceded federal 
jurisdiction to New York376 and Kansas377 in other Acts. 
In Public Law 280 states, New York, and Kansas, the federal 
government maintains no jurisdiction. Currently, tribes may 
maintain concurrent jurisdiction, but scholars believe that 
concXUUenW jXUiVdicWion iV ³incompaWible ZiWh Whe cXUUenW 
jXUiVdicWional Uegime in PXblic LaZ 280 VWaWeV.´378 Thus generally, 
if the crime was committed in a Public Law 280 state, or New York 
or Kansas, the state has jurisdiction.  If the crime was not committed 
 
369 Id. at 921. 
370 Cunningham, supra note 129, at 2190. 
371 Id.  
372 Id. 
373 Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness 
in California Indian Country, 44 UCLA L REV. 1405 (1997). 
374 State Jurisdiction Over Offenses Committed by or Against Indians in the 
Indian Country, 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1953).  
375 Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 42, at 1406.  
376 Act of July 2, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-881, 62 Stat. 1224. 
377 Act of June 8, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-565, 54 Stat. 249. 
378 Cunningham, supra note 129, at 2191. 
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in one of those states, the jurisdictional question proceeds to step 
three. 
 
a. General Federal Applicability 
 
If the crime committed is a crime of general federal 
applicability, then the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction. 
These are crimes such as mail theft and treason. If the crime is not 
one of general federal applicability, then the prosecutor moves to 
step four. 
 
b. Race of the Victim and the Accused 
 
The race of the victim and the offender is the most essential 
question of whether the tribal courts have jurisdiction.  Whether or 
noW Vomeone iV an ³Indian´ iV deWeUmined b\ ³ZheWheU Whe peUVon in 
question has some demonstrable biological identification as an 
Indian and haV been Vociall\ oU legall\ Uecogni]ed aV an Indian.´379 
Only if both the victim and the offender are Indian, or if the offender 
is Indian and the crime is a victimless crime, does the tribe have 
jurisdiction over the matter. If the victim is a non-Indian, then the 
tribe has concurrent jurisdiction. 
The modern test for criminal jurisdiction prevents tribal 
courts from being able to prosecute non-Indian people. Therefore, 
this paper proposes other workarounds are necessary to be able to 
maintain some order within Indian Country. Civil jurisdiction 
presents one such workaround.380 
 
II. THE APPLICABILITY OF CIVIL JURISDICTION 
TO NON-INDIANS 
 
A tribe generally has civil jurisdiction over a non-Indian on 
Indian fee simple land.381 However, due to the checkerboard of 
 
379 Robert Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A journey Through 
a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503, 520 (1976). 
380 See infra Section I.C.; Section III. 
381 Montana v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981); see supra Section II a (stating 
that later court decisions have muddied this rule and lower courts have gone in 
diffeUenW diUecWionV on ZhaW UXle applieV). A fee Vimple land inWeUeVW iV ³[a]n 
interest in land that, being the broadest property interest allowed by law, endures 
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interests that non-Indians have in Indian Country, it is not 
uncommon for a non-Indian to escape civil jurisdiction in tribal 
courts for any number of reasons.382 In addition to civil jurisdiction 
on fee simple lands, the Supreme Court of the United States has 
created civil jurisdiction in tribal courts over non-Indians in certain 
circumstances under the Montana Rule.383 Since Indian tribes are 
unable to criminally enforce laws, and Indian land has become a 
patchwork of jurisdictions due to a plethora of historic 
disenfranchisement of Indian people to their land, Indian tribes can 
extend their civil regulatory power in Indian Country using the 
Montana Rule. 
 
A. Checkerboard Jurisdiction 
 
FoU peUhapV all of Whe UniWed SWaWeV¶ legiVlaWiYe, poliWical, 
and social history tribal land has been actively divided into many 
ownerships, such that a person traveling through Indian Country will 
typically travel in and out of Indian fee-land.384 The Allotment Era, 
for instance, vested areas of Indian land of no more than 160 acres 
to any one Indian.385 At the same time, however, the federal 
government divested a lot of that land causing Indian inventory of 
land to fall by sixty-two percent.386  
Even when Indian land was not affected by the Allotment 
Era, non-IndianV ³used the Burke Act to obtain lands from Indians 
WhaW oWheUZiVe ZoXld haYe Uemained in WUXVW.´387 Of the 86,000,000 
total acres that were lost, 38,000,000 were sold to non-Indians as 
³VXUplXV´ landV.388 Following these sales, the exterior boundaries of 
 
until the current holder dies without heirs.´ FEE SIMPLE, Black'V Law 
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 
382 See, e.g., Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 452 (1997). 
383 Montana, 450 U.S. 544. 
384 Robert Anderson, Negotiating Jurisdiction: Retroceding State Authority Over 
Indian Country Granted by Public Law 280, 87 WASH L. REV. 915, 921 (2012). 
385 Patents to be held in trust; descent and partition, 25 USC § 348 (1940). 
386 See Pommersheim, supra note 20, at 255-56 (citing Charles F. Wilkinson, 
American Indians, Time, and the Law 20 (1987)). Monroe Price and Robert 
Clinton estimate a 90 -million-acre loss over the period. See Monroe E. Price & 
Robert N. Clinton, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN: READINGS, NOTES AND 
CASES 629 (2d ed. 1983). 
387 L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribe Sovereignty at the Millennium, 
96 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 830, n. 130 (1996). 
388 Id. 
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many reservations were redrawn, officially diminishing tribal 
territory.389  
Keeping in mind the history that has plagued Indian land 
UighWV, hoZ WhoVe land UighWV haYe affecWed IndianV¶ abiliW\ Wo 
adjudicate, is complex. Nonetheless, the Montana rule, which 
permits tribes civil jurisdiction outside of Indian trust land, gives 
tribes the ability to enforce civil laws within a checkerboard 
jurisdiction.  
 
B. Civil Regulatory and Adjudicatory Authority Over Non-
Members 
 
The Supreme Court has found that Indians have the legal 
authority to adjudicate non-member Indians390 when the Indian tribe 
has regulatory power over those same people, whether they are on 
or off tribal land.391   If the tribe has the authority to regulate, then it 
has the power to adjudicate said regulation.392 That being said, the 
poZeU Wo adjXdicaWe doeV noW e[ceed Whe WUibe¶V aXWhoUiW\ Wo 
regulate.393  
 
C. The Montana Rule 
 
The United States Supreme Court decided the issue of 
whether Indians had civil regulatory power over non-Indian people 
in Montana v. U.S.394 The Supreme Court had previously recognized 
WhaW Indian naWionV aUe ³domeVWic dependenW naWionV´395 that retain 
all inheUenW VoYeUeign poZeUV ³noW ZiWhdUaZn b\ WUeaW\ oU [fedeUal] 
statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent 
status.396 Therefore, Indian nations should maintain civil regulatory 
power over non-Indian people; however, by the time of Montana, 
 
389 Id. 
390 A non-member Indian, is an Indian that is a member of another tribe. 
391 Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 814 
(9th Cir. R. 2011). 
392 Sarah Krakoff, Tribal Civil Judicial Jurisdiction over Nonmembers: A 
Practical Guide for Judges, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1187, 1213 (2010). 
393 Id. (citing A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. at 452). 
394 Montana v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
395 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. 1, 17. 
396 U.S. v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). 
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the Supreme Court had to reconcile contradictory precedents.397 In 
doing so, the Supreme Court created the Montana Rule, which states 
that Indian tribes may not exercise civil regulatory authority over 
non-Indians, except in two circumstances.398 First, a tribe may 
UegXlaWe Whe ³acWiYiWieV of nonmembeUV Zho enWeU [inWo] conVenVXal 
UelaWionVhipV ZiWh Whe WUibeV oU iWV membeUV.´399 Second, a tribe may 
regulate the conduct of non-IndianV ³Zhen WhaW condXcW WhUeaWenV oU 
has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic 
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.400 
Focusing on the first exception, in a recent decision, the Fifth 
Circuit has delineated clear rules on when a person or entity 
³conVenWV´ Wo WUibal jXUiVdicWion.401 Dolgencorp Inc., better known 
as Dollar General Store, had operated a business within the 
boundaries of tribal land.402 As a part of the agreement to operate on 
tribal land, there was a lease agreement that mandated Dollar 
General Store to participate in the ³YoXWh OppoUWXniW\ PUogUam´ 
(YOP), which requires the hiring of young tribal members.403 
Subsequently, the manager molested his employee and was sued in 
tribal court.404 The manager argued tribal courts have no jurisdiction 
over non-Indians, the Fifth Circuit did not agree.405 The court ruled 
that by doing business on the reservation he had consented to tribal 
jurisdiction.406 
The Fifth Circuit, affirmed by a four-four split by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, stated that while a suit against a non-Indian creates 
issues of subject-maWWeU jXUiVdicWion, ³a fedeUal coXUW haV no 
independenW obligaWion Wo µcoUUecW¶ a WUibal coXUW¶V lack of VXbjecW-
maWWeU jXUiVdicWion´ e[cepW foU in ³e[WUaoUdinaU\ ciUcXmVWanceV.´407 
 
397 Dean B. Suagee, The SXSUePe CRXUW¶V ³WhacN-a-PROe´ GaPe TheRU\ iQ 
Federal Indian Law, a Theory that has No Place in the Realm of Environmental 
Law, 7 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 90, 97 (2002).  
398 450 U.S. at 565. 
399 Id.  
400 Id. at 566; In the 34 years since Montana, courts have steadily narrowed both 
exceptions to the rule. See AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK 191±210 (Claw 
Smith ed., 4th ed. 2008). 
401 Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167 
(2014) (Affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court. Dollar General Corp. v. 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (June 23, 2016). 
402 746 F.3d at 169. 
403 Id. 
404 Id. 
405 Id. at 170. 
406 Id.  
407 Id. at 176±77. 
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Therefore, an Indian nation is presumed to have civil jurisdiction 
over non-Indians except in special circumstances. There have been 
no cases, as of yet, which define those special circumstances that 
may eliminate the presumption of civil jurisdiction.  
1. The Montana Rule Applied 
 
As stated, Indians are presumed to have civil jurisdiction on 
Indian trust land. The Montana exceptions specifically apply to a 
person that is not a member of a tribe, and not on tribal fee land, but 
still within Indian Country.408 However, later cases have muddied 
the previous clear rule stating that the Montana rule applies both on 
and off Indian fee land.409  For instance, in Nevada v. Hicks, the 
Supreme Court looked at whether a tribe may assert jurisdiction over 
civil claims against a state official who entered tribal land to execute 
a search warrant against a tribe member.410 The court ruled that 
because the tribe lacked legislative authority to restrict, condition, 
or otherwise regulate the ability of state officials to investigate off-
reservation violations of state law, they also lacked adjudicative 
aXWhoUiW\ Wo heaU Whe UeVpondenW¶V claimV WhaW WhoVe officialV Zho 
violated tribal law in the performance of their duties.411  
In applying Hicks, lower courts have diverged into separate 
camps. For instance, the Eighth and Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
has expressly held that Hicks extended the Montana analysis to all 
reservation lands, regardless of ownership.412 On the other hand, the 
Ninth Circuit has adopted a far narrower interpretation of Hicks. 
Specifically, in Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area v. LaRance, 
Whe coXUW conclXded, ³ZheUe WheUe aUe no VXfficienW compeWing VWaWe 
interests at play, . . . the tribe has regulatory jurisdiction through its 
inherent authority to exclude, independent from the power 
recognized in Montana.´413 The Ninth Circuit recognized that 
IndianV, eYen Zhen Whe\ ³lack cUiminal jXUiVdicWion oYeU a non-
Indian defendanW, [ ] µpoVVeVV WheiU WUadiWional and XndiVpXWed poZer 
to exclude persons whom they deem to be undesirable from tribal 
 
408 See generally, Montana, 450 U.S. 544. 
409 533 U.S. 353 at 375-376 (2001). 
410 Id.  
411 Id. 
412 Philip H. Tinker, In Search of a Civil Solution: Tribal Authority to Regulate 
Nonmember Conduct in Indian Country, 50 TULSA L. REV. 193, 201±02 (2014). 
413 Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 810 
(9th Cir. 2011 (hereinafter Water Wheel).). 
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landV.´414 The Ninth Circuit went further and stated that the 
³aXWhoUiW\ Wo e[clXde non-IndianV´ of enWU\ inheUenWl\ giYeV a WUibe 
Whe poZeU Wo UegXlaWe, Vpecificall\ ³place condiWionV on enWry, on 
conWinXed pUeVence, oU on UeVeUYaWion condXcW.´415  
Therefore, given that Indian tribes have regulatory and 
adjudicative authority tribes should be able to have jurisdiction 
when a forum selection clause or other contractual relationship 
exists as a condition to enter. 
 
III. RESTORATIVE JUSTICE PRACTICES AND THE NEED FOR 
TRADITIONAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
 
The traditional legal system for Indians is typically very 
different from Euro-American law.416 For that reason, when 
European settlers came to America, they did not recognize Indian 
legal systems.417 As discussed above, that trend has continued to this 
day. Nonetheless, it is useful to contrast Euro-American crime and 
punishment with rehabilitative practices traditionally and currently 
used in Indian Country. 
Euro-American law splits types of wrongs into two 
categories, harm to society and harm to an individual.418 Courts are 
divided into two systems to deal with each type of harm either 
having a criminal case or a civil case.419 The difference between 
these two systems are demonstrated in several ways. For example, 
in a cUiminal caVe Whe pUoVecXWoUV aUe WiWled aV ³The People,´ ³The 
SWaWe,´ oU ³The UniWed SWaWeV´ compaUed Wo Whe indiYidXal¶V name in 
a civil case.420 Another example between criminal and civil cases is 
the punishment. In criminal cases, criminal defendants are often 
imprisoned, while in a civil matter the harm is repaired with a 
monetary gain.421 Legal scholars have several policies for 
differentiating and employing civil and criminal punishments.422 
 
414 Id. (citing Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 696±97 (1990)). 
415 Id. at 811 (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144 
(1982)). 
416 Id. at 9. 
417 Id. at 10. 
418 Garrow, supra note 43, at 3. 
419 Id. at 4. 
420 Id. at 3. 
421 Id. at 5. 
422 Id. at 13. 
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Additionally, criminal law has four theories of punishment²
retribution, incapacitation, deterrence, and rehabilitation.423  
Unlike Euro-American justice systems, traditional Indian 
legal systems often times did not differentiate between actions that 
harmed an individual and actions that harmed a community.424 In 
fact, tribal tradition would often times consider any harm done to an 
individual to be a harm to the whole.425 Another difference is that 
Indian legal systems are usually entirely oral, spiritual, and 
intertwined with stories that teach both children and adults social 
norms.426 Their belief system fuels and informs their legal system. 
For instance, tribal law tended to focus on communities rather than 
the individual because WheiU belief V\VWem highlighWed ³dXWieV and 
UeVponVibiliWieV Wo familieV, clanV, and Whe WUibe.´427 In Euro-
American law, unlike traditional tribal law, the law focuses on 
individual rights, like those enumerated in the U.S. Constitution.428 
Of course, not all tribes are the same. There are 562 federally 
recognized tribes429 in North America with cultures that expand the 
distance of 9.54 million square miles.430 Many people of Indian 
tribes did have individual rights and those rights were often 
considered necessary to fulfill responsibilities to the larger 
community.431 For instance, the Yurok believed justice for every 
wrong could be dealt with through negotiation or compensation.432 
Not only is Euro-American and traditional Indian 
philosophy different, but so is their implementation of punishment. 
TUadiWional Indian cXlWXUe focXVed on ³UeVWoUing peace and haUmon\ 
Wo Whe indiYidXal and commXniW\.´433 While there are limitless 
 
423 Id. at 16.  
424 Id. at 4. 
425 Id. at 9. 
426 Id. at 10. 
427 Id. at 13. 
428 Id. at 13. 
429 An Introduction to Indian Nations in the United States, NATIONAL CONGRESS 
OF AMERICAN INDIANS, available at http://www.ncai.org/about-tribes 
[https://perma.cc/G2M5-VURP]. This number only includes federally 
recognized tribes and does not include the tribes that have been demolished, 
killed, or have not yet or will not be federally recognized. Id. Indian history is 
complex in America and should not be limited. Id. 
430 U.S. SWaWe Dep¶W, Common Core Document to U.N. Committee on Human 
Rights (Nov. 1997) https://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/og98005.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EG5T-FZ4H]. 
431 Garrow, supra note 43, at 14. 
432 Id. 
433 Id. at 16. 
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amounts of traditional forms of justice, the Navajo tradition of 
Peacemaking has the most extensive information due to the years of 
implementation and research compared to the recent revitalization 
of traditional forms of justice in other tribes.  
 
A. Introduction to the Process and Purpose of Traditional Forms 
of Justice 
 
Peacemaking is a traditional form of justice from the Navajo 
Tribe.434 This form of justice has gained traction with other Indian 
nations throughout the United States.435 In fact, a small number of 
counties throughout the United States have started to use traditional 
forms of justice on a trial basis.436  
Peacemaking iV conVideUed ³hoUi]onWal´ foUm of jXVWice, 
which means that the system is non-hierarchical.437 For instance, the 
victim, offender, and all those affected by the crime discuss the 
issue, and express their feelings to get to the underlying problems.438 
The purpose of this practice is to restore harmony to everyone 
included in the proceedings and the community at large.439 This is 
done by both discussing the problem and participating in lessons that 
teach the values of the community.440 In contrast, the model in the 
UniWed SWaWeV iV ³YeUWical´²which relies on hierarchies. For 
example, the judge controls the courtroom, the attorneys are 
adversarial, and only one-party wins.441 
The philosophy of peacemaking has two core principles²
hozho and hoxcho.442 Hozho ³meanV haUmon\ in Whe enYiUonmenW,´ 
while its opposite, hoxcho, means ³an imbalance of haUmon\.´443 The 
purpose of the peacemaking justice system is to look at the core of 
 
434 See Wanda D. McCaslin, JUSTICE AS HEALING: INDIGENOUS WAYS (Wanda 
McCaslin, 1st ed. 2005). 
435 Xiaobing Xu, Different Mediation Traditions: A Comparison Between China 
and the U.S., AMERICAN REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 542 (2005). 
436 See, e.g., Janine Geske & India McCanse, Neighborhoods Healed Through 
Restorative Justice, 15 NO. 1 DISP. RESOL. MAG 16 (2008). 
437 Marilyn Holly, Navajo Criminal Justice: A Jungian Perspective, NATIVE 
AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 17 (2006). 
438 Id. at 17±18. 
439 Id. at 18. 
440 Id. 
441 Id. at 17. 
442 Id. at 18. 
443 Id. 
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the disruption and bring it to balance. Therefore, the courts look to 
³heal, noW pXniVh.´444  
The procedure of the peacemaking court is specific to the 
Navajo nation²beginning with a prayer and asking for help to the 
creator for a successful ceremony.445 The purpose of the prayer is to 
bring an energy to the room that arouses focus and energizes 
people¶V inWenWion Vo WhaW Whe\ can idenWif\ Whe diVhaUmon\.446 Those 
who are present are encouraged to express their feelings and state 
what they think caused the problem.447 After the attitudes and 
feelings of the participants have been expressed and acknowledged, 
an elder or peacemaker gives their guidance in a form of a lecture to 
the disputants.448 When each peUVon knoZV each oWheU¶V feelingV, 
and has heard the values and traditions of their people, they are ready 
to begin discussing how to resolve the dispute.449 The resolution 
plan should compensate and sufficiently restore good feelings to all 
those who are concerned.450 
 
B. How Similar Methods of Justice has been Implemented in Non-
Indian Country 
 
Some counties in the United States have begun using 
peacemaking²for example, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Judges have 
begun experimenting with using Native-American inspired justice 
systems.451 The retributive system of justice in Milwaukee has 
created a revolving door of incarceration that continues from one-
generation to the next.452 Milwaukee has one of the highest 
incarceration rates of African-Americans in the country.453 Like 
many large cities, there is daily violent crime and prisons are 
filled.454 Milwaukee, recognizing this issue, is attempting methods 
of justice other than the Euro-American system.  
 
444 Id. at 23. 
445 Id. at 25. 
446 Id. 
447 Id. 
448 Id. 
449 Id. 
450 Id. 
451 Geske, supra note 155, at 527.  
452 Id. 
453 Id. 
454 Id. 
93 
 
Justice Janine P. Geske, a Milwaukee Supreme Court 
Justice, has shared her experience and results of implementing this 
experimental justice system.455 According to Justice Geske, 
MilZaXkee¶V implemenWaWion iV baVed on NaYajo Peacemaking.456 
Like  in Navajo Peacemaking courts, the victim, the perpetrator, and 
the community are all invited.457 She states that the main difference 
between Navajo Peacemaking and traditional forms of Euro-
American justice systems is the person leading the discussion. In 
MilZaXkee¶V UeVWoUaWiYe jXVWice pUogUam, Whe ³ReVWoUaWiYe JXstice 
IniWiaWiYe´ leadV Whe commXniW\ engagemenW VecWion and opeUaWeV a 
restorative justice model for achieving new outcomes.458  
Milwaukee implemented restorative justice concepts to 
³decUeaVe cUime b\ implemenWing alWeUnaWiYe meanV of laZ 
enforcement, increased community engagement, and new 
pUacWiceV.´459 The justice system strives toward these goals by 
³deYeloping UelaWionVhipV, VWUengWhening commXniW\ WieV, and 
holding Walking ciUcleV foU a YaUieW\ of conVWiWXencieV.´460  
MaUqXeWWe¶V UeVWoUaWiYe jXVWice pUacWice iV highlighWed aV being 
³YicWim-dUiYen´ and ³Veek Wo place haUm in Whe middle of Whe 
eqXaWion.´461 The highlighting difference between the two justice 
philosophies is punishment versus healing. 
In Milwaukee, there are two different kinds of peacemaking 
courts. The first type of peacemaking court is for offenders returning 
from prison. The second is for first-time offenders using restorative 
justice as an alternative to a jail sentence.462 For those returning from 
prison there are two steps in the process² the first step is the pre-
meeting, and the second step is the talking circle.463 In the pre-
meeting, law enforcement talks to the offender to let the offender 
know that sending them to prison is not the goal of the state; 
however, they also alert the offender that they are being observed 
for the safety of the community.464 The offender then goes into the 
Peacemaking circle, where the community is there to support the 
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offender, but also to notify the offender they will not put up with the 
violence in their community anymore.465 The community, victim, 
and offender talk²for many this is the first time any of them get to 
tell their story.466 Support is given to everyone on an individualized 
manner depending on how the discussion progresses.467 One of the 
keys of Peacemaking is to get the victim to describe their life before 
the crime, what they experienced during the offense, and how the 
event has affected them.468 The more the victim shares, the more 
powerful the experience and the better chance for a positive 
experience for those involved²healing for the victim, decreased 
chance of recidivism for the offender, and feeling safe for the 
community. 
With such a different purpose, also came starkly different 
results. Justice Geske shared several stories of her experience with 
the peacemaking court. These stories were highly emotional and 
moved the participants in ways that will change their lives²two 
stories specifically demonstrate the spectrum of community-wide 
benefits. In the first story, there was a member of the Latin Kings 
gang, who had just been released from jail. The ex-gang member 
shared his story with the community, one of which was an officer 
who had a lengthy, but compassionate, story he shared with the ex-
gang member. After the meeting, the ex-gang membeU ³appUoached 
[Whe] compaVVionaWe officeU afWeU Whe ciUcle´ and Wold him WhaW he had 
never had a discussion with an officer like that before.469 The police 
officer and gang member shared their contact information and they 
have stayed in contact since.470 In another similar story, a mother of 
a police officer shared her story of losing her son.471 The officer 
went into a gas station to buy a cup of coffee, when he exited, he 
was stopped by two men at gunpoint wanting to rob him.472 The two 
men patted down the police officer for a wallet, and when the 
robbers felt his gun they shot and killed him.473 
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These two stories share how people felt before and after 
these criminal acts were committed. Often times, offenders are 
iVolaWed fUom Whe commXniW\ and do noW feel Whe YicWimV¶ oU Whe 
commXniWieV¶ VoUUoZ, pain, and loVV. FXUWheUmoUe, Whe YicWim iV able 
to talk to the offender, which victims have stated have helped in the 
healing pUoceVV. JXVWice GeVke belieYeV WhaW ³UeVWoUaWiYe jXVWice 
circles work because they create a safe place for everyone at the 
Wable, Zhile UemoYing boXndaUieV WhaW keep people VepaUaWed.´474 
 
C. The Benefits of Having Traditional Forms of Justice in Indian 
Country 
 
Restorative justice works in both Indian communities and 
non-Indian communities.475 States are allowed to use restorative 
justice on people of all races; however, Indians are not able to 
practice criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.476 This inability to 
practice criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians hurts tribal 
sovereignty, victims of crimes, the community, and the offenders. 
Using restorative justice to deal with crime could help Indian 
communities overcome high crime rates and heal community-wide 
trauma by empowering victims and strengthening the communities. 
To show the benefits of traditional forms of justice, this section 
begins with how traditional forms of justice have failed Indians. 
Next, this section discusses how traditional forms of justice may 
heal and empower Indian people and communities in ways that 
Euro-American justice has failed. 
 
1. Indians Suffer from High Crime Rates in their 
Communities 
 
Indians experience violent crimes at a far higher than the 
general population.477 In fact, Native Americans are more than two 
times as likely to be a victim of a crime than all other races 
 
474 Id. 
475 See supra Section II. 
476 See supra Section II. 
477 National Institute of Justice, Tribal Crime and Justice, OFFICE OF JUSTICE 
PROGRAMS, https://www.nij.gov/topics/tribal-
justice/Pages/welcome.aspx#noteReferrer2 [https://perma.cc/M489-XLYT] (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2017).  
96 
 
combined, or any race individually.478 Of those crimes committed 
against Indians thirty percent of murders of Indians people were 
committed by non-Indians.479 In sixty-six percent of assaults against 
Indians, the perpetrators were described as white.480 In total, sixty 
percent of Indian victims surveyed described their assailant as 
white.481 
Indian Zomen Vpecificall\ VXffeU ³Whe higheVW UaWeV of 
domeVWic Yiolence, Ve[Xal Yiolence, and Ve[ WUafficking´ of an\ oWheU 
group in the United States.482 Native American woman are three 
times more likely to experience domestic violence than any other 
racial group.483  And seventy-five percent of all Native American 
women experience some form of sexual assault in their lives.484 
HXman WUaffickeUV haYe been knoZn Wo ³UecUXiW´ aW NaWiYe AmeUican 
schools, group homes, youth centers, and powwows.485 Even though 
Indian women are victims at a rate beyond other groups, Native 
American men are still more likely to be crime-victims, than their 
female counterparts.486 
Despite the high crime rate, Native American people are less 
likely than other races to report crimes.487 Some of the reasons that 
NaWiYe AmeUican¶V do noW UepoUW cUimeV VWem fUom a Zide aUUa\ of 
UeaVonV, VXch aV cXlWXUal baUUieUV and high leYel of miVWUXVW of ³ZhiWe 
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dominaWed agencieV.´488 The mistrust comes from calculable 
shortcomings within Indian Country. For instance, women who 
UepoUW domeVWic abXVe conWinXall\ UepoUW WhaW ³police did noW pUoYide 
adequate protection or follow-up services in response to the 
Zomen¶V callV.´ 489 Another issue is that without an investigation, 
police often do not believe the women who report crimes. For 
instance, when one woman called to report domestic violence, the 
police required her to undress to show them the bruises.490 The 
police then reported she was drunk, even contrary to hospital reports 
saying she was not under the influence of any intoxicants.491 
Abuse toward Native Americans perpetuates the issues 
within the Indian community, which leads to generations of abused 
people.492 These high crime rates create a wound in the community, 
one that would traditionally be mended through community action 
and restorative justice.493 If shut off from traditional forms of justice, 
which aim to restore the community, the community continues to 
suffer. Thus, federal laws that have created barriers to traditional 
forms of justice that would be better suited at healing Indian 
communities, inflict lasting pain on the community. For instance, 
the Oliphant decision has limited the ability of Indian court systems 
of holding non-Indian people in their judicial system. Since 
approximately sixty percent of crimes against Indians are committed 
by what Indian people identify as white, the Oliphant decision limits 
Indian judicial review in nearly two-thirds of crimes against Indians.  
Further, The Major Crimes Act disturbs traditional justice 
methods by removing criminal jurisdiction from Indian Courts into 
Federal Courts. Indian courts may maintain concurrent jurisdiction 
with federal courts; however, the federal government tends to hold 
defendants and criminals and not turn them over for an extended 
amount of time. This can keep the tribe from dealing with the 
suffering or loss from the victim and disorient the community for 
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months and sometimes even years depending on how long it takes 
for the federal government to investigate and try a case. 
 
2. Healing Trauma in Court 
 
a. Re-Enforcing Power to the Victims 
 
Allowing traditional forms of justice may lessen the affects 
that being a victim will have in the future. For instance, 
psychological studies have shown that thirty-five percent of male 
sexual abusers have had been sexually molested as a child.494 In fact, 
those who have been abused, especially sexually, are far more likely 
to commit crime in general.495 Beyond the cycle of criminality, those 
who have been abused are also more likely to suffer from 
alcoholism, sexual maladjustment, and multiple personality 
disorder.496 Although these statistics are troubling, Martha Erickson, 
a psychologist at the University of Minnesota, states, to fix the issue, 
Whe commXniW\ ³need[V] Wo coXnWeUacW Whe child¶V e[pecWaWionV WhaW 
adXlWV Zill be deepl\ XncaUing.´497  Traditional forms of restorative 
jXVWice inYolYeV Whe commXniW\, and can help coXnWeUacW offendeUV¶ 
antisocial behavior by recognizing that the offender may have been 
victimized previously.   
Traditional forms of Indian justice are victim oriented, and 
result in a more caring culture, created with the purpose of 
healing.498 Peacemaking lookV aW a YaUieW\ of ailmenWV WhaW ³WUaXma´ 
can cause including the spiritual, emotional, physical, and mental 
ailments that come with being a victim.499 This healing is 
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individualized and does not focus on attempting to cure the 
symptoms, but the root of their affliction.500 Furthermore, because 
those most affected by the victimization are involved by the 
sentencing process and have input in the decision have shown to be 
able to handle mental health issues better.501 
 
b. Strengthening the Community 
 
Another benefit of restorative justice is to heal the 
community. With Indian communities having some of the highest 
crime rates in the United States, many Indian people do not feel safe 
in their own neighborhoods.502 Violence in the community affects 
more than just the victim, it also affects the community as those 
members no longer feel safe in their own home. Community 
members are explicitly listed as a part of the participants in nearly 
all Indian traditional justice.503 Similar to a victim, participating in 
the circle allows the community to give transparency to the 
problems of the community and be a participant, not a spectator. Not 
only is there more transparency, but traditional means of justice 
allows the community to heaU Whe offendeU¶V VWoU\ and paUWicipaWe in 
the healing.504 As Chief Justice Yazzie of the Navajo tribe states: 
 
What is an offender? It is someone who shows little 
regard for right relationships. That person has little 
respect for others. Navajos say of VXch a peUVon, µHe 
acWV aV if he haV no UelaWiYeV.¶ So, ZhaW do \oX do 
when someone acts as if they have no relatives? You 
bring in the relatives!505 
 
This idea goes to the ideology that the community is there to help. 
Navajo Peacemaking court not only gives the victim a community 
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to rely on, but gives the community involvement to learn the 
offender and realize they are humans who hurt just like them.506 
 
IV.  USING THE MONTANA RULE AND CIVIL JURISDICTION TO 
ENFORCE TRIBAL JUSTICE 
 
Given current law, tribes should be able to create consensual 
relationships when a person enters Indian Country to allow 
traditional forms of justice between Indians and non-Indians. This 
paper has delved into whether a tribe can create a consensual 
contractual relationship with those entering. It appears, that a tribe 
can. The following section focuses on the specifics of what tribes 
have attempted to do and where tribes have failed. Specifically, 
where tribes have generally failed in the past, is that tribes have 
attempted to extend jurisdiction through the internet, which neither 
VWemV fUom ³Whe WUibe¶V inheUenW VoYeUeign aXWhoUiW\ Wo VeW condiWionV 
on entry, preserve tribal self-government, or control internal 
UelaWionV´ noU did iW VWem fUom an\ ³acWion´ WhaW UelaWed Wo Vaid 
inherent sovereignty. However, traditional forms of justice, for 
healing and cUiminal acWiYiW\ VWemV fUom all of iW. A peUVon¶V 
criminal conduct and entry onto tribal land relates to the inherent 
sovereignty of the tribe. 
 
A. Contractual Agreements Creating Civil Jurisdiction for 
Traditional Forms of Justice 
 
General rules of contracts would allow a contract to be 
formed by a sign when entering reservation land.507 For a contract 
to be formed, both an offer and acceptance is required.508 The 
reservation in making its offer may require acceptance in 
³peUfoUming a Vpecified acW.´509 The non-Indian¶V enWU\ ZoXld 
constitute acceptance. Furthermore, if an offeree does not read the 
Vign, iW doeV noW make Whe offeU oU accepWance inYalid aV ³no 
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noWificaWion iV neceVVaU\ Wo make VXch an accepWance.´510 Here, a 
non-Indian¶V accepWance of Whe conWUacW²choosing to come onto 
tribal property with notice that doing so will subject them to tribal 
justice in civil disputes² demonstrates the non-Indian¶V accepWance. 
511 
A contract also requires consideration.512  Consideration is 
³[V]omeWhing (VXch aV an acW, a foUbeaUance, oU a UeWXUn pUomiVe) 
bargained for and received by a promisor from a pUomiVe.´513 In this 
case, there would be adequate consideration. It is a well-established 
rule that tribes have the power, as a sovereign, to exclude non-
Indians or even non-member Indians.514 In exchange, the Indian 
nation maintains the ability to have civil jurisdiction over the non-
Indian people. Because tribes have the power, as a sovereign, to 
exclude people from their reserved land there is a detriment for a 
bargain being exchanged. Using performance contract principles, 
tribes could require visitors to consent to tribal justice upon entering 
tribal land.  
Assuming a valid contract is formed, the consensual 
relationship²the contract²mXVW VWill haYe a ³ne[XV´ Wo Whe 
regulation being imposed²here tribal justice. 515  As discussed in 
the Dolgencorp case, there is a nexus between the consensual 
UelaWionVhip and UegXlaWion Zhen Whe UegXlaWion¶V pXUpoVe iV 
³pUoWecWing [Whe WUibe¶V] oZn childUen on iWV oZn land.´516 By this 
UeaVoning, a ne[XV e[iVWV Zhen Whe WUibe¶V UegXlaWion VeUYeV Wo 
protect its own people on its own land, even when applied to non-
Indians. The nexus in this proposal is no different: this consensual 
relationship provides a way for Indian communities to heal from the 
trauma inflicted by non-Indian on Indian violence.  By requiring 
consent to tribal justice in exchange for entry, the tribe ensures tribal 
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access to traditional justice. Although a contract may be formed, 
whether the contract is enforceable, specifically a forum selection 
clause, can be a trickier issue. 
 
B. Application of Forum Selection Clause 
 
Generally, forum selection clauses are enforceable.517 
Specifically, Indian tribes have generally been able to enforce forum 
selection clauses.518 However, the courts have limited the reach of 
forum selection clauses for tribal jurisdiction in certain 
circumstances.519 Namely, federal courts have limited forum 
selection clauses made in Indian Country to the extent that a tribal 
coXUW haV ³adjXdicaWiYe jXUiVdicWion.´520 Federal courts have stated 
that subject matter jurisdiction in tribal courts over non-Indians, is 
³WeWheUed Wo Whe nonmembeU¶V acWionV . . . on Whe WUibal land.´521 In 
sum, for a forum selection clause to be enforceable the court will 
look to the actions of the party, the non-Indian, to find whether a 
tribe has adjudicative jurisdiction. In Western Sky Financial, the 
court stated that declaring, over the internet, that you were 
physically present on tribal land was a legal fiction.522 That the 
defendant in that case never showed up to the reservation nor did the 
defendant pay money on the reservation.523 The case implies, then, 
that actual presence is sufficient to create adjudicative 
jurisdiction.524 
Courts have upheld arbitration clauses on non-Indian fee 
land.525 However, that decision did not discuss the issue of fee land 
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and non-fee land.526 Instead, whether a forum selection clause is 
valid in application of Indian land depends on several factors. 
When deciding whether a forum selection clause is valid, 
courts apply an Erie choice of law inquiry.527 In contracts, the court 
applies the law of the jurisdiction whose rules will govern the rest 
of the dispute.528 In Payday Financial, the court was prepared to 
apply tribal law to the forum selection clause, however, in a 
VXpplemenWal bUief, Whe WUibe ZaV ³unable to locate tribal precedent 
addUeVVing foUXm VelecWion claXVeV.´529  Instead, the court applied 
fedeUal laZ and looked aW ZheWheU Whe laZ ZaV ³XnUeaVonable XndeU 
Whe ciUcXmVWanceV.´530 The court noted that only three circumstances 
where the presumptive validity of an arbitration clause is suspect: 
 
(1) if their incorporation into the contract was the 
result of fraud, undue influence or overweening 
bargaining power; (2) if the selected forum is so 
µµgUaYel\ difficXlW and inconYenienW WhaW [Whe 
complaining party] will for all practical purposes be 
depUiYed of iWV da\ in coXUW[ ]¶¶; oU (3) if enfoUcemenW 
of the clauses would contravene a strong public 
policy of the forum in which the suit is brought, 
declared by statute or judicial decision.531 
 
In this particular circumstance, the court stated that because the 
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe did not authorize arbitration, hire 
arbitrators, and does not have consumer dispute rules the forum 
selection was invalid.532 
Analyzing the shortcomings of the Cheyenne River Sioux 
TUibe¶V aUbiWUaWion pUoceVV ma\ help oWheU WUibeV Wo XndeUVWand Whe 
procedural maze that is involved with federal, state, and tribal 
jurisdictions that all compete for jurisdiction in these manners, and 
to have more success. First, tribes should have tribal statutes 
outlining forum selection clauses, defining terms, and looking at 
case statute. Second, forum selection clauses should not be 
³XnUeaVonable XndeU Whe ciUcXmVWanceV.´ FoU inVWance, Whe claXVe 
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should not be illusory or unconscionable²both of which is a 
generally good practice to ensure that parties participating in 
alternative dispute resolution come out satisfied.533  
While forum selection clauses are unlikely to cover all who 
enter Indian Country, especially non-fee land, any expansion of 
jurisdiction over non-Indian and non-member Indians having 
accountability to the tribe and its people is a step towards healing. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Traditional forms of Indian justice are beneficial for Indian 
victims and the community, as well as non-Indian offenders.534 Due 
to the Supreme Court case Oliphant, Indians do not have access to 
traditional forms of criminal justice.535 While this paper proposes 
contracts to create a consensual relationship to extend civil 
jurisdiction to non-Indians, the larger idea is that Indian people need 
to use creativity in the legal system to access forms of justice better 
suited to healing Indian communities. Civil jurisdiction may be one 
means to erode barriers to Indian justice, but Indian communities 
have struggled since Euro-American law was imposed on them. 
Indian people need an expansion of tribal sovereignty, not a 
restriction, that has been the pattern as of colonization, to help Indian 
people. Extending tribal court jurisdiction to non-Indians and 
reinstating traditional justice would be a powerful step toward re-
empowering tribal sovereignty and Indian people. 
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